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Abstract
Reputation systems are very useful in large online commu-
nities in which users may frequently have the opportunity to
interact with users with whom they have no prior experience.
Recently, how to enhance the cooperative behaviors in the
reputation system that has became to one of the key open
issues. Research in the evotutionary game theory shows
that the group selection or multilevel selection can favor
the cooperation in the finite populations. Further more,
Nowak et al., in [1], [2] give a fundamental condition for
the evolution of cooperation by group selection.Based on
the above important result, we extend the group selection
concept in evolutionary $biolog\nu$ andpropose agroup-based




$P2P$ networks define a class of systems and applications
in which autonomous hosts (peers) pool their computing
resources and collaborate to perform a special task. All peers
have identical fimctionality and play the role in both servers
and clients. Unfortunately, the lack of a centralized trusted
entity capable of monitoring user behavior and enforcing
mles complicates the design of mechanisms for detecting
and preventing malicious behavior in autonomous environ-
ments. So, the importance of tmst management became more
and more crucial in open network. Tmst and reputation
techniques as one of the key issues in trust management have
proven to be essential to enforcing cooperative behavior in
peer-to-peer networks. Many solutions have been proposed
in [3], [4], [5], [6], and each employing a different model
of computing trust, disseminating and storing reputation
data and responding to the non-cooperation in the network.
However, the anonymousness and inherent virtually of the
Intemet hamper the implementation of the practical reputa-
tion system; the selfish peers always act to achieve their own
best benefits by sharing no resources, or cheating others, and
so on. For example, in Gunutella file-sharing system [7],
over 70% of the content was provided by just 5% of the
users. So, how to enhancing the cooperative behaviors has
become the open problem in $P2P$ reputation systems.
1.2. Motlvatlon
Group selection refers to in evolutionary biology, and it
was firstly proposed by Sewall Wright [8], then further resur-
rect by Wilon et al., whose works have been part of a broad
revival of interest in group selection (or multilevel selection)
as an explanation for evolutionary phenomena. The basic
idea of group selection can be best illustrated by an example
of the difference between group and individual selection,
where selection on inner-group favors defectors, whereas
selection on the inter-group favors cooperators. Contrasting
to the individual selection theories which explain change
in terms of the survival of individuals that are fitter than
others and ignore the contexts of those individuals in temis
of the strategies of others that an actor interacts with, group
selection theories account for the co-evolution of both fitter
individual strategies and groups of interacting strategies in
groups, and it explains the emergence of cooperative youps
[1], [2], [9], [10]. Recently, people also use group selection
theory to explain the cooperative behavior in other applica-
tions filed, such as [11], [12]. Nowak et al., in [1], [2] give
a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by
group selection, and it provides a mathematical method to
analyze that under certain conditions nature selection can
favor cooperative traits that benefit groups as a whole, but
reduce individual fitness relative to the rest of their group.
Unfortunately, most of the existing research about the
cooperation in reputation system ignore the significance of
the social properties of peers and the importance of namre
selection both in individual level and mareo-level. So, group
selection mechanisms may offer a new way of explaining
such a cooperation happened in reputation systems, also
provider ffiRher insight into the way cooperation can and
does develop and the factors affecting its emergence.
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1.3. Related works
Considering the significance of the economic and social
properties of peers in reputation systems, some research
discuss and propose related mechanisms for the evolution of
cooperation in multidisciplinary field. E.g, Lik Mui et al., in
[13] stress the importance of social information when peers
in the social network choose the targeted interactive object.
In order to provide more cooperative agent communities,
they propose a mathematical framework for modeling tmst
and reputation that is rooted in findings from the social
sciences. Beverly Yang et al., in [14]propose an economic
protocol to ensure that peers cooperate in the operation of
$P2P$ systems in the face of competition. Wang et al., in
[15] propose new measurements to characterize the social
properties of tmst systems, and they use the Vickrey-Clarke-
Grove-like reputation remuneration mechanism to simulate
rational peers who truthfUlly offer feedback. Their result
shows the emergence of certain social propeities in trust
networks.
Also, a few research inspired by the group selection
for evolution of cooperation in evolutionary game theory.
E.g, David Hales et al.in [16], [17] propose a simple self-
ish re-wiring protocol that can spontaneously self-organize
networks into intemally specialized groups, and related
simulation shows their approach scalable, robust and emerg-
ing self-organizing phenomena. They make some strictly
assumptions, something like: individual can discover others
randomly ffom the network, compare its utility against
others, and so on. However, these assumptions may not
reflect the real situation in $P2P$ reputation system.
1.4. Challenge Issues
Before to introduce the group-based mechanism to reputa-
tion systems in $P2P$ network, some key challenges need to be
resolved here. such as: research in biological and social com-
munities shows that, as already mentioned, defector ”wins”
against cooperators within inner groups, while cooperator
groups outperform defector groups. A tension therefore
arises between the evolution of competitive behavior within
groups and the evolution of cooperative groups. Do the
same results apply to reputation systems in $P2P$ network?
If the results can apply, how can the groups evolve? such
as: initialization of groups; members management, groups
split, group elimination, and so on.
1.5. Our Contributlon
The main contributions of this paper include:. Extending the group selection in the evolutionary game
theoiy, we propose a group based mechanism to en-
hance cooperation for $P2P$ reputation system.
. Giving the basic theoretical analysis when applying
the group selection theory to explain our proposed
method, and doing some simulations about the pro-
posed method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as following:
Section 2 proposes a group based mechanism for enhancing
cooperative behaviors in the reputation system. Section 3
gives the theoretical analysis of dynamics of $P2P$ reputation
systems.We will do some simulation to analyze our method
in the Secction 4 Finally,we will concludes the paper.
2. Group Selectlon based Mechanism
2.1. Preliminary
From a sociological angle, individuals in the population
have different relationship with each other. For example,
individuals, genetic relatives or in same tribe (species), are
prone to cooperate with each other. In order to describe the
social property of individuals in $P2P$ reputation system, we
define and extend the concept of group as following:
DefinitIon 1: Group, $G$, is the set of individuals with
certain social relationship.
We assume that each group has a unique identity
(GroupID) in the network, and each individual must belong
to one group, and also with unique identity (UserlD).
In social networks, the ffust degree between people may
be different due to the reason of emotion, preference, belief,
and so on. In this paper, we simplify the process, and
define the concept friend factor to reflect the tmst degree
of different individuals in the group:
Definition 2: Friendfactor, $f$, is the trust degree between
individuals in the group.
We assume that individual decide the ffiend factor ac-
cording to the history of satisfaction transaction between
individuals, and it can be computed it as following:
Where the Num-int and Num-sat are threshold times
of satisfaction interaction and actual satisfaction interaction
times, respectively.
Fig. 1 gives an example of the dynamics of ffiend factor
between $i$ and $j$ . The increase of $f$ is very slowly, while
$\hslash st$ after several times interactions. This cuive just reflects
that people always keep the cautious attitude toward the un-
familiar ones, while like to reward the already known people.
We can find that if individuals $aIt$ more cooperative, then $f$
will be bigger. By setting the value ofNum-int, individuals
can control the ffiend factor with others, also incent others
to keep cooperation.
Definition 3: Neighor of source individual is the individ-
ual who have the direct interactive experience with it.
How can we imagine the behavior of individual in the
$P2P$ networks? That is a very tough problem to make
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Such assumptions make the network as realistic as possi-
ble, but also simple enough to be practically computable.
Figure 1. Friend Factor. The friend factor $f$ climbs when
the actual satisfaction interaction time increases, and it
will keep at the constant 1 when the satisfaction times
no less than the threshold satisfaction interaction. Here
Num-int $=20$
that assumption. Unfortunately, it’s the first obstacle before
designing an ideal interaction protocol for $P2P$ reputation
systems. Some research makes assumption that individuals
can act perfectly rationality, and with common knowledge.
However, individuals in the open environment may be not fa-
miliar with each other. If there are no central and authorized
individuals which can help them making trust decisions,
individuals are hard to know the others strategies or possible
outcomes, also some other random factors can affect the
behavior of individuals. If we just simply assume that peers
can do anything they want to, it may be too complex to
beyond state-of-ait analytical techniques [17].
Inspired the assumptions in [17], we conclude the behav-
ioral assumption in this paper as follows.:. Individual may change its current strategy when sat-
isfaction score below the threshold value in the last
interaction.. Individual is bounded rationality and incomplete
knowledge.Beside the benifits they get ffom transac-
tions, individuals’ strategies or behaviors also affected
by other random factors (e.g,, emotion, bias, etc). It
means that they may not achieve the maximum benifits.. The individuals in the different groups can’t interact
with each other.
Also, we make some assumptions about the scale of
groups in this paper.. The lower bound and upper bound number of individual
in one group are $t_{1}$ and $t_{2}$ , respectively, and $t_{1}>2t_{2}$ .. The maximum number of groups in the network is $m$,
and there is at least one group in the network.
Let $N$ be the scale of the network, so, it satisfies:
$t_{2}\leq N\leq mt_{1}$
2.2. Group Formation
Group fornation is a process that describes the dynamics
of groups in the network. And it includes several processes,
such as: Group Initialization, Group Splitting and $G\prime vup$
Elimination. In the section, we will give the detailed infor-
mation about these processes.
Group InmalkBon.How can a new individual join this
system? Fig.2 gives an example of the process of group
initializtion.
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Figure 2. Initialization process. If a peer wants to join
the system, it should register firstly. And the system
will assign a unique identity to him, and then map the
peer into a group (in the example, $G1$ chosen) based on
certain principle.
The detailed process of Group Initialization is listed as
following:. Registration: the new individual register in the reputa-
tion system and the system will assign a unique identity
to it.. Mapping to group: The system will map the new entry
into certain group in the network, and the probability
of the group chosen is propoition to its size. Assum-
ing that there are $g$ groups $\{G_{1}, G_{2}, \ldots, G_{g}\}$ , and let
$\{n_{1},n_{2}, , n_{9}\}$ be size values of the $g$ groups, where
$n_{i}$ is the i–th group scale. So, the probability of a
individual $a$ will map to i–th group is:
$Pr(a, G_{i})=n_{i}/ \sum_{j=1}^{g}n_{j}$. Reputation Initialization. Assigning the initial repu-
tation to the new individual. This process is very
important in the real reputation system. If the initial
value is too small, the new individual will take long
time to cumulate enough reputation to take part in co-
operation with others. However, if the initial reputation
is too high, the new individuals may be malicious or
ffeeriders. The proposed method in [8] to solve this
problem.
Group splltting. When the group size reach the upper
bound $t_{2},it$ will be split into two sub-group with 1/2 chance,
. Fig.3 gives an example that the Group Splitting:
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Figure 3. Group Splitting. $G$ split into two sub-groups
$G_{1}$ and $G_{2}$ when the scale of $G$ exceed the $t_{2}$ .
Note that the members in the splitting group will have
equal chance to join the other two sub-groups.
Group elimination. There are two cases when the group
elimination happens:
Case 1: the number of members in the group is less than
the lower limit $t_{2}$ .
Case 2: the number of group in the network is more than
the upper limit $m$ .
To case 1, we just remove the group ID in the system.
But if the case 2 happens, the system will choose the lowest
utility group to die.
When a group is chosen to delete ffom the system,
how about the members in the group? We think that these
individuals have choices to join other groups in the network.
Note that they don’t need to re-register in the system, but
to keep its original ID, and reputation information. Here,
we develop an algorithm to mapping these individuals into
groups.
The detailed algorithm is list as follows:
1 $)$ Setting counter-time $=1$ ;
2 $)$ Mapping $a$ into certain group, and the probability of
a individual $a$ joining certain group is proportion to
the group’s utility:Pr $($a$, G_{i})=f(U_{Gi}),heref$ is
arbitrary function, $U_{Gi}$ is the utility of group $G_{i}$ ;
3 $)$ Assuming $G$ be chosen in step 2, then $G$ will check $a$ ’s
reputation. If reputation(a) $\geq avr_{-}reputaion(G)$ .
$G$ accepts $a$ as its member, then add $a$ into $G$, end the
algorithm;
4$)$ Or else, then the $G$ have 0.5 chance to refuse $a$ ’s
joining; if $a$ is accepted, end the algorithm.
5$)$ or else, If counter-time $\leq 3,then\omega unter_{-}time++$
and go to step 2;;
6$)$ else end the algorihm.
As in the above algorithm, if the individual isn’t accepted
by certain groups within the three times, the system will
automatically remove the individual. or if the invidual’s
repution is very low enough, it will be removed by system
with nearly 1/8 probability.
Considering the uncertain factor in the open environment,
we define some concept, originated $\hslash om$ biology, to reflect
the uncertain factors of peers’ strategies.
Deflnition 4: Migration is the process that a individual
move ffom one group to other group.
If individuals find that they can get more benefits ffom
other groups, or just want to change their current environ-
ment, they may drop out their current groups, and then re-
enter to other groups. Let $r_{-}mig$ be the probability of
imitation of individual in each round.Fig.4 gives an example








Figure 4. Migration process. Peer $a$ in the group $G1$ is
randomly chosen to migrate. Then,a will find its destina-
tion group based the certain principle. lf $G2$ is chosen,
then $a$ will enter as a member of group $G2$ .
Deflnition 5: Mutation is the process that a individual
suddenly change its strategy to another random one.
In our mechanism, we allow a individual with certain
probability to remove all its links between its neighbors, and
then randomly links to one individual in the group to dicribe
the individual mutation. Let pr-mut be the probablity of
mutation of individual in each round.
Definition 6: Merger is the process that two groups merge
into one bigger group.
Let pr-meg be the probability of group merger happens
in the each round.
3. Theoretical Analysis
In the evolutionary game theoiy, the selection acts not
only on the groups but also on individuals. If no other
mechanisms, the defectors are initially favored by individual
selection in the group, while the cooperative groups will win
in the group selection.
In the $P2P$ reputation system, individuals engage in some
application task and generate some measure of utility U. $U$
is a numeric value that everyone must calculate based on
the particular application domain’s specifics. For example,
this might be the files downloaded, jobs processed, or an
inverse measure of spy ware infections over some period.
The higher the value of $U$, the better the node believes it’s
performing in its target domain.
Fig.5 describes the dynamics of the tmst structure in
$P2P$ network. The individual plays trades with its neigbois
which are individuals have the direct interaction with each
20
Table 2. Simulation Parameters
Figure 5. Adaptive of Trust Structure.
other. If the individual (not a pure altmists) always cannot
benefit Rom the trade, then it will change strategy to adapt
with the current environment. Thus, it will lead the strategy
dynamic. However, the strategy dynamic of that individual
may also affect the performance and strategies of its neigh-
bors. The aggregation change and dynamics in the individual
level can lead to the dynamics of the group level network
which will lead the evolution of the network topology. Also,
when facing to the new topology, an individual need to
adaptive its personal strategies and behaviors to get some
benefits Rom transaction between others. Thus, the feedback
loop between an individual level and group level is formed.
To simplify the process, we assume that the interaction
between individuals are Hawk-dove game, and there two
strategies in the game: cooperate $(C)$ , defect $(D)$ . Due to
the special relationship between the individual in the group,
the payoff (or utility) matrix between individuals [18] is:
Table 1. Payoff Matrix.
Here $c$ is cost of utility when joining the interaction, $b$ is
the benifit of utility from the interaction, and $f$ is the Riend
factor between individuals.
4. Numerical Simulation
We will address by use of the NetLog 4.0.3 to analyze
our proposed method. The basic parameters will be used in
the network are listed in the Table 2.
Fig.6 shows the scene of Group Initialization. The new
individual will be mapped into groups, and most groups with
nearly same scale. Also, some groups suddenly become to
big because of the group merger happening.
Fig. 7 shows that the selection will favor the cooperative
groups. If the $b/c$ is bigger enough,the cooperative groups
will dominate the whole network quikly.
Fig. 8 and Fig.9 show the individual level selection, and
we can see that cooperators and defectors will co-exist and
Figure 6. Group lnitialization.The clusters in the net-
work denote the group. The model parameters for this
figure: $t_{1}=4,$ $t_{2}=20$ , pr-mut $=0,$ $pr-mig=0$
$pr-meg=0.04$. $f=1$ and $b/c=1.3$
all of them have chance to occupy the group when the $b/c$
is smaller, while the $b/c$ is big enough, cooperators will
dominate over defector in the last.In fact, there may also
happen defectors or cooperator disappeared if the network
scale is small,which affected by random drift.
Fig.10 shows the average groups size in the network.As
we can see that the average size will keep near a constant
when time passing. In the beginning, we think that the
cooperative groups may be more attractive and will become
bigger and bigger. The reason that leads these phenomena
not happened may be that the group will more risk to be
affected by defectors when the scale of group is big.So,
there is a tradeoff between the size and risk of the group.
Figure 7. Group Selection.The model parameters for
this figure: $d=4_{I}t_{1}=150,$ $t_{2}=2000,$ $\Psi-mut=0.03$ .
$pr-mig=0.07_{1}\psi_{-}meg=0.04$ and $b/c=1.60$
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Figure 8. Individual Selection.The $m$ el parameters
for this figure: $d=4,t_{1}=150,$ $t_{2}=2\alpha$)$0,\psi_{-}mut=0.03$ ,
$\psi_{-}mig=0.07_{\Psi-}meg=0.04andb/c=1.54$
Figure 9. Indlvldual Selection.The model parameters
for this figure: $d=4,t_{1}=150,t_{2}=3000,$ $\psi_{-}mut=0.03$ ,
$\Psi_{-}^{mig}=0.07,\psi_{-}meg=0.04andb/c=2.40$
5. Concluslons
In this paper, we extend the concept of group selection
in evolutionary game theory, and provide a group based
mechanism to enhance the cooperation in $P2P$ reputation
system. The related simulation results show that our method
can enhance the cooperative behavior in the network.
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